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T
he 1960s and ‘70s were not a very propitious 
time to undertake independent research on the 
USSR. Despite the excellent training we had 
received at various Russian institutes set up after 
World War II, the Cold War atmosphere draped its 
pall over Soviet studies. Restricted access to the 
Soviet Union itself, its archives and other resources 
raised further practical and psychological barriers. 
All this combined to create the image of a closed, 
monolithic, totalitarian society.
Nevertheless, once in the USSR, one could 
discover chinks and patches of transparency in that 
forbidding facade—provided one had the luck to 
meet and interact with Soviet citizens and was 
sufficiently open-minded not to suspect a KGB agent 
behind every friendly face. In my case the 
opportunities to find an “unbuttoned” Russia came 
before 1 started my academic research: first during a 
tourist trip in 1958; then working as a guide for the 
first American Exhibit in Moscow in 1959. Brief tour 
and longer stay both disclosed unexpected facets of 
Soviet society: the existence, not of widespread 
dissent, but of individual opinion and independent 
thinking that patently did not echo the tone of the 
Soviet press and publications. This discovery, in 
turn, shaped my procedure during various later 
academic research trips. I would call it an 
“asystemic” approach, one that treated each Soviet 
specialist as a scholar defined by his/her own work 
and not by the system. Furthermore, this view 
facilitated access and communication, gained the 
confidence of Soviet interlocutors, and much 
generous help as well.
Initial Contacts and Experiences
In 1958 I took a ten-day Intourist trip to Moscow, 
Leningrad and Kiev. On the very first day, while our 
group was waiting to see Lenin and Stalin (then still 
together) in the mausoleum, a tall man from the 
Caucasus (to judge by his Astrakhan hat) approached
us and said jeeringly: “Imagine waiting in line just to 
see two devils in a box!” He expressed his 
sentiments in Russian and loud enough for all to 
hear. Then he simply walked off. He neither tried to 
nor could merge into the crowd: he was much too tall 
and there were not many people on Red Square. The 
fact that no one arrested him on the spot went 
counter to all the graduate-school lectures on the 
controls and terror that had reduced the population to 
abject silence and conformity.
The following days of the excursion reinforced 
the impression that Soviet citizens were not 
conforming to the totalitarian model. There were no 
more defiant pronouncements in public, yet in a 
subdued manner it became clear that there were areas 
of personal liberty or discretion that individuals 
exercised in ways that did not fit my bookish 
“expertise.” Take the way our Intourist guide treated 
me. Since the group was composed of elderly 
teachers from England who knew neither Russian 
nor much about the country, the guide suggested that 
I visit various sites of interest on my own. I already 
spoke Russian easily, was familiar with the history 
and culture, and carried a heavily annotated 
Baedeker. Neither I nor the guide, with whom I kept 
up for a while afterwards, got into any trouble for 
these independent side trips.
In Kiev she suggested that I attend an evening 
concert for young people. Although I can't recall the 
program in detail, one thing is certain: it was not the 
customary mix of folk and patriotic repertoire but a 
selection of contemporary Russian and French songs, 
more romantic than political. Soon after the concert 
started, an older man from the city Party organization 
got up, indignantly denouncing the program, and 
threateningly asked who had authorized the 
organizers to mount such a spectacle. The quick and 
unambiguous answer was: article such and such of 




My next trip to Russia was in 1959, as a'guide in 
the book section of the first American Exhibit. 
During those six weeks I had a sharper exposure both 
to Party controls and to the decency and personal 
courage of ordinary citizens. Before the Exhibit 
opened in the Sokolniki park, our shelves underwent 
official Soviet inspection. All books deemed 
offensive, subversive or suspect were removed, 
including a volume by John Kautsky on the Indian 
Communist Party (despite my pleas that the author 
was not the same Kautsky with whom Lenin had had 
his disagreements). Freud somehow escaped the 
censorship and visitors eagerly leafed through this 
taboo author and asked questions. When too large an 
inquisitive crowd gathered around a guide, some 
Party activist would invariably appear and interrupt 
with, “What about the oppression of Negroes in 
America?” or some similar hostile query. And just as 
invariably someone in the crowd would tell the 
activist not to bother the young guide and let people 
go on with their questioning.
We were also assisted by Soviet visitors when we 
were overwhelmed with questions about the 
unfamiliar forms that were displayed next door at the 
art exhibit. (That show was pretty tame in not 
straying too far from realism, but it did have one 
Jackson Pollock and an abstract sculpture by Rivera.) 
Frankly, we book guides could not always give 
answers that went beyond “You are free to like or 
dislike non-realist art.” But again, invariably 
someone in the crowd would come up with lengthy, 
patient explanations that showed familiarity with 
modem art and its forms. They talked in terms of 
space, color, line—concepts that were not much used 
in Soviet publications. The repeated demonstration 
that the art appreciation of Soviet citizens was not 
limited to socialist realism, that some were familiar 
with the aesthetic vocabulary current in the West, 
gave me a sense of comfort—the idea of a common 
language existing between us.
Academic Research: Soviet-Third 
World Relations
From 1967 on, after an eight-year interval, 1 
started going regularly to the USSR to do scholarly 
research. I was extremely fortunate to have Philip E. 
Mosely as my mentor and sponsor. Without his 
example and support, all the personal experiences 
and insight acquired during the previous two visits 
would not by themselves have enriched my academic 
work. Although Phil's field was foreign policy, he
was among those pre-World War II specialists whose 
knowledge of Russia extended far beyond 
diplomacy. He had lived and worked in the USSR in 
the early 1930s, spoke fluent Russian, and had a 
profound, sympathetic understanding of Russian 
culture. A major figure in organizing postwar 
Russian area studies, he was one of the early 
directors of the Russian Institute at Columbia. The 
program the Institute offered reflected the broad 
experience and familiarity of the older generation of 
American Sovietologists. All students, regardless of 
their chosen specialization, were required to take 
courses in literature, history, economics, in foreign 
and domestic policies, as well as to acquire a 
competence in the language to qualify for the 
certificate. That comprehensive two-year program 
gave me the background which made travel and 
work in Soviet Russia so meaningful and rewarding.
Mosely was also active in promoting various 
official and unofficial American-Soviet cultural 
exchanges ranging from the Quakers to IREX. At the 
same time he kept up cordial personal ties with 
Russian emigres as well as with Soviet scholars. He 
was greatly esteemed by both communities. The fact 
that he was a hard-liner in foreign policy matters in 
no way diminished the respect he enjoyed among the 
Soviets who worked for the UN or passed through 
New York on official business. Quite the contrary, 
I'd say: his straightforward integrity raised their 
respect all the more.
In the early 1960s I started working for Phil 
Mosely, who planned at the time to write a book on 
Soviet policies in the Third World. After several 
years of analyzing official statements and other 
relevant materials, I became restless with the lack of 
hard information that would indicate the priorities, 
institutional interests, or range of 
options—information that would introduce a 
modicum of reality into the ritualized Soviet 
formulas and our Western abstract analysis. Careful 
reading in Soviet academic journals had given me a 
sense that one could get behind the official facades. 
From about 1963/64 on, publications like Mirovaya 
ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, Aziya i 
Afrika segodnia, Narody Azii i Afriki began to print 
articles that hinted at disagreements over old 
orthodoxies and suggested new interpretations.
So I asked Phil to arrange a grant from Columbia 
University to spend a month in Moscow interviewing 
those Soviet specialists whose arguments represented 
the “new thinking” of those days. He readily backed 
my project, arranged for the necessary funds, and
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provided me with valuable introductions to various 
highly placed Soviet experts. Among the persons 
Mosely knew was V. Solodovnikov, director of the 
African Institute, and an assistant to A. Rumiantsev, 
head of the social sciences division of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences. With their generous help in 
turn, I was able to meet people like Viktor Sheinis, 
Nikolai Shmelev, Georgi Mirsky, Leon Zevin, 
Nodari Simonia, Sergo Mikoyan, Aleksei Kiva—to 
name just a few—a veritable pleiad who initiated the 
unorthodox thinking of the 1960s and ‘70s. Here lay 
the roots for later reforms in foreign policy 
formulations and actions.
The initial contacts were most gratifying and I 
would consult with them again and again over the 
course of the next 30 years, always assured of a 
ready reception and an interesting talk. Even when I 
came to Moscow to work on Russian art, I felt free to 
drop in on them for a chat and to keep up the cordial 
ties.
The 1967 interviews revealed a surprising range 
of non-conformist views, which certainly did not 
echo the prevailing official line. Many of the 
interviewees spoke not only of their own research 
interests but would also expound on Soviet-Third 
World relations and developments in the Third 
World itself. Many questioned the simplistic and 
confident cliches about the “inevitable” drift of the 
developing countries toward socialism, an 
assumption that justified Krushchev's drive into the 
post-colonial areas. Simonia, for example, was 
derisively skeptical that the Third World would 
choose a “non-capitalist path” of development, when 
the facts showed that only a very small fraction of 
the newly independent states chose to implement 
those proto-socialist policies.
My first articles were limited to describing the 
disagreements among Soviet academics about the 
course of events in the developing countries. In other 
words, what was the mindset among experts, many 
of whom advised the Central Committee's 
International Department or the Foreign Ministry. 
These articles covered the debates about the 
feasibility of industrialization and collectivized 
agriculture; about planning and a mixed economy; 
about trade and aid with East and West; demographic 
problems, class structure, and the role of 
acculturation in economic development.
In subsequent publications I began to comment 
on the actual Soviet policies. Having managed to 
penetrate below the official surface, I was able to 
describe with some assurance (as against speculative
reading between the lines) Soviet-Third World 
relations as ridden with problems, uncertainties, and 
a rising sense that these policies were an expensive 
failure from which the USSR should somehow 
extricate itself. My arguments did not conform to 
what was the prevalent line in our country—not only 
in Washington but also in academe.
It amuses me to think now that while I had the 
respect of Soviet scholars, the same could not always 
be said of my American colleagues. Take as an 
example the reception accorded my piece on “The 
USSR, the Third World and the Global Economy.” It 
was written for a Council on Foreign Relations study 
group on Soviet foreign economic policies (for 
which one other author also outlined the diminution 
in Soviet intransigence and the evident wish to 
emerge from economic isolation). But such 
arguments ran counter to the then accepted wisdom, 
and the Council did not turn the group's papers into a 
book, as planned. When my piece did appear in print 
{Problems of Communism, July-August 1979), one 
male Sovietologist advised me, "Elizabeth, you had 




In the mid-1970s, my interests branched out into 
art history. The reason for this was my earlier 
decision to write a doctoral dissertation on the 
nineteenth-century group of Russian realist painters, 
the Peredvizhniki (or the Wanderers), rather than on, 
say, “Lenin and the East” or some such “fascinating” 
topic connected with my work on the post-colonial 
world. Once the dissertation was finished, I was 
urged to expand it into a book, to go beyond the 
group's formative period and peak years of influence 
(1860s-1880s) into the further story of their decline, 
their scant reputation after the October Revolution, 
and then in the 1930s their becoming the exemplar 
for Socialist Realism. So with the help of IREX 
grants I made several trips to Moscow and Leningrad 
in search of information and of supplementary 
material.
Of course, IREX was invaluable in arranging 
travel, accommodations, and archival access. Again, 
I had excellent introductions, this time from John 
Bowlt, a personal friend with vast knowledge of the 
Russian art scene, past and present. Art specialists, 1 
quickly learned, were divided into two camps, 
roughly speaking—the liberals and the
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conservatives—each with a different evaluation of 
the Peredvizhniki. Having the benefit of the two 
opposing viewpoints opened my eyes not just to 
various disputed issues but also to the extent of 
politicization and outright falsification that 
characterized Soviet art history after 1934.
The conservatives (basically Stalinists) were 
connected mainly with the Soviet Academy of Arts, 
held high positions in the administration of the arts, 
and were busy producing thick, factual biographies 
of realist painters or editions of their correspondence 
with very full annotations (factually correct, but very 
slanted ideologically). The independent-minded 
liberals, also in government employ, tended to hold 
teaching posts in universities or to work in art 
research institutions associated with the Ministry of 
Culture, not the Academy. Their publications did not 
challenge the official schemas directly but certainly 
presented a less slanted image of Russian nineteenth- 
century culture (i.e., Chemyshevsky and Co. were 
not necessarily gospel) and tried to provide broader, 
fresher interpretations. Museum staffs tended to lean 
toward the liberal side, in part because many curators 
were scions of the old intelligentsia rather than 
products of the social upheavals of the 1930s.
I had good rapport with both groups; both tried, 
each in its own way, to facilitate my work. And I am 
indebted to them alike. The conservatives presented 
me with copies of their volumes. These were very 
useful once one got past the tendentious 
introductions and interpretations; the facts and 
references were there, so were the texts of 
correspondence or memoirs. (Due to this generosity I 
acquired a fine collection of basic books in the field 
at no cost other than the books on American art I 
would mail them in return.) Scholars of liberal 
persuasion did not have as many publications to 
offer. But their questions and suggestions prodded 
my mind out of its initially narrow framework, 
formed back home from reading the official 
historiography. Their comments made it plain, for 
example, that the Peredvizhniks’ traveling exhibits 
from 1871 on were motivated as much by a shrewd 
gamble to tap the market among the new middle 
class as by the proclaimed desire of the intelligentsia 
to “serve the people.”
I profited not only from the generosity and 
attention of both groups but also from their 
competition. Each, to one degree or another, was 
eager to influence how I would tell the story. Among 
the conservatives two scholars were most helpful: the 
late A.A. Lebedev, editor of Ilya Repin's extensive
correspondence, and the late Iosif Brodsky, professor 
at the Repin Institute at the Academy of Arts in 
Leningrad.
Among the independent-minded scholars I must 
mention Dmitri Sarabianov, professor of art history 
at Moscow University, and the late A. Savinov, who 
taught art history both in Moscow and Leningrad. I 
should also single out Grigory Stemin, at the 
Institute of the History and Theory of Art, author of 
several unconventional histories of Russian art at the 
turn of the century; and Ilia Zilbershtein, the tireless 
editor of Literaturnoe nasledstvo and of 
documentary volumes on art. They all upheld the 
tradition of academic excellence and tried to broaden 
the area of the permissible. Zilbershtein, for example, 
was responsible in the 1960s for eliminating several 
“blank spots” in Stalinist historiography. He 
rehabilitated, first, Valentin Serov and then Sergei 
Diaghilev and other Mir iskusstva figures, who had 
been derogated by the conservatives as decadent and 
harmful to Russian culture.
Undoubtedly the greatest stroke of good luck I 
had was to gain access to the papers of the State 
Committee on Art, set up in 1936 as a political 
watchdog and command center for the Stalinization 
of the field. Under its strong-arm guidance the 
Peredvizhniki, as I found out, were transformed into 
painters of world stature (Repin became the equal of 
Raphael and Rembrandt not just through alliteration), 
into painters selflessly dedicated to serving society; 
and into cultural chauvinists disdainful of 
Impressionism and any other style that elevated form 
over content.
Reading the minutes of the Committee's meetings 
with various academic institutions and scholars, its 
plans for publication and for exhibits, exposed the 
mechanics of Stalinization that took place in the 
1930s—how orders were decreed from above, how 
specialists were told to rewrite their works, how 
opportunists rose to positions of authority by toeing 
the Party line, how museums were commanded to 
cleanse their walls of decadent—i.e., of non-realist 
art—and to mount ideologically proper exhibits.
How did I gain access to this material in the 
Tretiakov Gallery archive? It was Zilbershtein who 
suggested I look at these documents; and the 
archivist at the time, Sofia Goldshtein, a fine scholar 
in her own right, readily granted the permission. 
Both have since died and I cannot now ascertain the 
reason for their permissive lapse, but I am inclined to 
attribute it to the fact that they were members of the 
old intelligentsia or old Bolsheviks, and that their
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own work was not marked by the pliant opportunism 
of those who followed the official line.
There is an interesting postscript to my initial 
success in gaining access to the State Committee's 
materials. A decade later, when working on Repin's 
biography, I requested the same papers in order to 
amplify a chapter on how Repin had been recast in 
the 1930s into the godfather of Socialist Realism. 
Permission was denied. By then there was a new, 
younger archivist (and head of the Tretiakov 
Gallery's Party cell to boot), who flatly said no. At 
the same time, I found out that Russian Realist Art, 
The State and Society, copies of which I had sent to 
all the libraries where I had worked, was not listed in 
their catalogues. The “subversive” information about 
the political pressures and shenanigans of the 1930s 
kept the book out of public circulation until the 
1990s.
Surveillance
What about surveillance and other political 
provocations? Nothing happened during my first two 
visits, although there were enough dubious Soviet 
characters working around the vystavka quite eager 
to befriend the guides. (The Exhibit managers 
warned us to stay clear of them and never to go out 
alone with a Soviet—an injunction I took with a 
grain of salt.) One friend—a musician—I acquired in 
1959 (and we still keep in touch) took me to visit 
little-known historical places in and around Moscow. 
A decade later, he would take me beyond the legal 
20-kilometer limit to smaller towns like Riazan. We 
would simply board the train and he did not even 
caution me to keep quiet. So we talked to other 
passengers and on one occasion sat with a group of 
students who recited Mandelstam's poetry.
Another acquaintance I made at the Exhibit—a 
journalist—did not prove to be such a reliable friend. 
In 1959 he took me to various historical spots 
beyond the 20-kilometer limit—to New Jerusalem 
monastery or the old town of Iur'ev Pol'sky. I do not 
remember any political conversations at that time. 
But when we met again in 1967, my “friend” took 
considerable interest in the work I was doing for 
Philip Mosely and at one point, on behalf of his 
journal (Za rubezhom, which covered the foreign 
press) asked me to write up something about my 
research interests. I was naive enough to oblige. His 
next step was to suggest that I write a piece on U.S. 
policies in the Third World—but this time for the 
Soviet intelligence. This request was conjoined with 
a bundle of crisp ruble notes and the offer of more
money upon my return to the States, with regular 
visits from someone in New York to pick up 
information on U.S. policies. Outraged, I showed the 
“journalist” the door and with a grand gesture of 
indignation threw the rubles after him into the 
corridor.
The incident did not frighten me. I didn't panic 
and run to the American Embassy for advice and 
protection. I suppose I was too ashamed of my own 
stupidity. So I continued doing research for Mosely, 
and there were no other attempts from the Soviet side 
to recruit my services. Here, it should be mentioned 
that American intelligence left me alone. The only 
incident concerned my taking A. Rumiantsev to the 
Museum of Modem Art in New York, sometime in 
the late 1960s. The next day the CIA called me up to 
find out whether there was any interesting 
information to share. Actually there were no tidbits 
to pass on, for example, about his editorship of 
Pravda. We had had a sociable visit talking about 
literature and art—from Paustovsky to Picasso. 
Again, as in the Soviet case, I was indignant and 
hung up on the caller from Washington. (I told 
Mosely of the call and he agreed with my response.)
There can be no doubt that I was watched and 
followed on each of my trips to the USSR. But I did 
not feel much constrained since I never knew or met 
any open dissidents. Accordingly, I always saw 
people I wanted to see or consult without taking too 
many precautions. And so far as I know, none of 
them suffered any consequences for having talked 
with me or inviting me to their home. However, 1 
was very careful not to leave my address book in the 
hotel room. So much so that once I interrupted an 
important interview to dash back to the hotel when I 
realized that I had left it behind. Amusingly, the 
director of the institute I was talking with understood 
my concern and even offered me his chauffeured car 
to get downtown quickly while he obligingly waited 
for my return to resume the interview.
I would leave my research (but not interview) 
notes in the hotel, in part to demonstrate that I was 
doing bona-fide academic work. But obviously such 
“candor” was not enough. Once in the mid-1980s, 
my bag with research notes on Repin disappeared 
mysteriously from my side at the Sheremetevo 
aii-port only to reappear equally mysteriously some 
eight hours later, long after the missed flight. The 
reason for this particular search became obvious only 
during Gorbachev's glasnost days. As it happened, 
two days before departure I had visited a woman 
historian whose efforts to discuss “blank spots” on
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the pages of Voprosy istorii were of interest to me. 
Unbeknown to me at the time, she was also a close 
friend of Andrei Sakharov and served as his liaison 
while he was exiled in Gorky. Clearly, I had been 
suspected of smuggling some manuscript.
Interviewing Techniques
The inferences I drew from personal encounters 
on the 1958 and ‘59 visits set the course for the way 
I later conducted interviews and sought access to 
research materials. Instead of being mesmerized by 
the Cold War image of the “other,” I tried to act as I 
would in any Western country. Because American 
colleagues marveled at my success in breaking 
barriers to get access to Soviet specialists and 
sources, let me set down a few points.
First of all, prior to going over I became as well 
acquainted as possible with the publications of 
various specialists to get a real sense of the quality of 
their work. It was not difficult to distinguish between 
genuine scholars and those I would call “political 
featherweights,” people whose analysis reflected 
more the political slogans of the day than solid 
research or original insights. Needless to say, I either 
tried to avoid the latter or talked to them mainly to 
gain a better understanding of the orthodox line; 
comparison would bring into sharper relief the novel 
and less conventional thinking of the honest scholars.
Thus prepared, I could express my interest in the 
work of interviewees as academic specialists. I 
would never start out with questions on some 
sensitive aspect of Soviet policy. It was easy enough 
to draw inferences about the conceptual framework 
in which official policy was carried out from their 
responses about their research—say, the composition 
and vanguard role of the working class in Africa.
My manner during interviews was relaxed, 
neither tense nor confrontational. Often a rewarding 
interview would start with mere chitchat on some 
totally unrelated matter. For example, my first 
meeting with V. Solodovnikov, director of the 
African Institute, began with his long description of 
his difficulties in getting proper tutors to coach his 
daughter for the entrance exam to Moscow 
University. Not exactly an insight into Soviet 
policies in South Africa but rather a peek into the 
lives of the Soviet elite, a tidbit that was equally 
fascinating to me as an outsider. In looking back on 
that conversation, my sympathetic listening no doubt 
put us both at ease.
I always reciprocated the Soviet specialists' 
generosity with their time and advice by writing
thank-you letters, by sending them the books in 
which they had expressed interest, and, once it 
became possible for them to travel West, by 
entertaining them in our home in New York and 
showing them the city's attractions.
I also gained the confidence and respect of Soviet 
specialists by producing what they regarded as solid 
publications. I was careful to avoid including 
information that might have been embarrassing to 
my hosts. For example, IMEMO (Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations) had two 
sections for the study of the working class abroad: 
one section continued in the orthodox groove, 
researching to prove its absolute impoverishment; 
the other initiated novel work on its differentiation. 
Much the same information could be conveyed by 
citing articles that disagreed about the strength and 
role of the working class in developing countries. My 
very first article, resulting from the trip in 1967 
(which appeared in World Politics in July 1968), was 
immediately translated into Russian. Friends at 
IMEMO later told me that it was distributed to young 
staff members as an example of careful research and 
objective writing that should be emulated.
Being a woman also worked to my advantage. 
The specialists I interviewed were predominantly 
men. They all treated me with deference and 
courtesy, even with a hint of male condescension. 
But I did not mind so long as they talked candidly 
and informatively; I never considered it demeaning 
or offensive. When one American colleague asked 
me outright what was the secret of my success in 
getting so much information from Soviet specialists, 
my answer—partly in jest—was “I flirt.”
Furthermore, the fact that I was born in Poland 
was probably an asset as well, although I have no 
particular feelings of Slavic solidarity. More 
important, I did not fit the typical Cold-War image 
that Russians had of Americans. As an example, on 
an early visit to IMEMO in the late 1960s I waited a 
long time in the reception room for someone to 
escort me upstairs. Finally, I asked a young man who 
was also sitting there whether Dr. So-and-so was in 
his office. It turned out that the young man had been 
waiting for me. But he was expecting a nattily 
dressed, heavily made-up, self-assured American 
who would be impatiently pacing up and down. As I 
was not acting like the “ugly American,” he had 
simply assumed I was another Soviet citizen.
The final advantage and facilitator in gaining the 
confidence and opening up my interlocutors was a 
genuine interest and knowledge of Russian history
21
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
and culture. Time and again I noticed how a 
conversation—especially with political 
scientists—became a mutually satisfying exchange 
when I mentioned, say that Gogol was among my 
favorite writers or that I was also writing on Russian 
art. An appreciation for Russian culture easily broke 
the ice. For example, when Egor Ligachev came to 
lunch at the Kennan Institute in 1991, the frigid 
unease with which the affair started disappeared 
when he heard that I had just published a biography 
of Ilia Repin. That was familiar territory, a topic that 
made him relax. He told us with delight that Repin 
was his favorite painter and from then on the 
luncheon took on an entirely different tone. 
(Parenthetically, information about a Soviet scholar’s 
or politician’s cultural tastes was a good indicator of 
his political outlook—whether he/she upheld the old 
orthodoxies or whether they appreciated trends not 
stamped with the official imprimatur.)
In Conclusion
Thinking back on my experiences in the USSR in 
the late 1950s and on doing research there during the 
following decades, I must confess to a tinge of 
nostalgia for those “old” not-altogether-bad days. 
There is no denying the various hardships and scares 
generated by the system and by the Cold 
War—something probably hard to image for people 
doing academic work decades later under entirely 
different circumstances.
Naturally one was well aware in those days of 
working and living in a system that was unfree, 
unjust, and arbitrary. Yet, there were challenges and 
rewards in going behind and beyond the system’s 
facade. It was truly inspiring to find out how many 
an individual managed to maintain personal integrity, 
to avoid performing unsavory political roles, to act 
like a free agent—for example, to invite foreigners 
home, which was my good fortune from 1968 on—or 
to open up a politically sensitive archive.
That experience and its rewards, I would 
imagine, were similar to those of an explorer or 
cartographer who comes upon some unknown river, 
area, or mountain. They have the thrill of penetrating 
a mysterious territory and the satisfaction of 
producing a better, more accurate map.
As I look back, it was really an extraordinary 
experience and privilege to have become acquainted 
with people who, back then in the 1960s, were 
unafraid to raise questions that did not comport with 
the accepted Marxist-Leninist categories. Getting to 
know the mind-set of “people of the sixties”
(shestidesiatniki in Russian) led me to take 
Gorbachev’s “new thinking” seriously. It had begun 
to sprout some 20 years earlier. Hence I could not 
dismiss Gorbachev’s reforms as mere political 
posturing to befuddle the West. To me they were 
signs of deeper processes maturing in Soviet society.
Perestroika was a sequential development from 
vigorous roots; it represented much more than the 
geopolitical dictates and economic needs of the 
moment. There was far more to Gorbachev’s 
changed course than the advice of Yakovlev (who 
was reputed to have “seen the light” during his 
Canadian exile). Gorbachev’s pool of informants and 
advisers, his support group, was much larger. It also 
comprised many shestidesiatniki in my own field. 
Because of familiarity with their increasingly explicit 
arguments about the poor prospects for revolutionary 
change and Soviet success in the post-colonial states, 
it came as no surprise to me that Gorbachev 
drastically reduced Soviet commitments in the Third 
World, pulling out of Afghanistan, Angola and Cuba.
These and other momentous changes of the late 
1980s had their origins in the first wave of new 
thinking in the 1960s-a development that the 
totalitarian model, with its own rigidities, did not 
accommodate.
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